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Expert Captured Democracies
By Archishman Chakraborty, Parikshit Ghosh and Jaideep Roy∗
Does public cheap talk by a biased expert benefit voters? The
answer depends on the nature of democratic institutions and the
extent of communication possibilities. Expert endorsements in-
duce office-seeking parties to serve the expert’s interests, hurting
voters. Expert advocacy makes policies respond to information,
helping voters. Together, policy advocacy and partisan endorse-
ments are often better than either alone. Their interaction cre-
ates a delegation benefit that makes indirect democracy superior
to direct democracy and office seeking parties better than those
motivated by public interest. But voter welfare is highest when an
expert captured technocratic party competes against an uninformed
populist one.
JEL: C72, D72, D82.
Keywords: experts, endorsements, advocacy, electoral competition,
indirect democracy, cheap talk, intermediation, delegation.
Democratic decision making in modern societies increasingly relies on critical
scientific input. The following questions are instantly recognizable from contem-
porary policy debates. Is there anthropogenic global warming? Are genetically
modified foods safe to eat? Can radiation from cell phones cause cancer? Is free
trade good for the average American?
These kinds of questions are central to the design of environmental policy, food
and drugs regulation, technology adoption and international relations. Voters
and politicians must turn to a small coterie of specially trained experts to learn
the answers. Yet, incorporating expert advice into policy making is not straight-
forward because experts are often perceived to be biased. Scientists who certify
GM foods as safe are accused of being funded by large agribusiness companies.1
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1The homepage of Britain’s Royal Society (https://royalsociety.org/topics-policy/projects/gm-
plants/is-it-safe-to-eat-gm-crops/), says, “Since the first widespread commercialisation of GM produce 18
years ago there has been no evidence of ill effects linked to the consumption of any approved GM crop.”
Yet, Greenpeace has declared golden rice, a fortified rice variety developed to tackle Vitamin A deficiency,
as “subjecting the population to unknown health risks” (Greenpeace. 2013. Golden Illusion: The Bro-
ken Promises of “Golden” Rice. https://www.greenpeace.org/international/publication/7136/golden-
illusion/). The mistrust between scientists and activists was underscored when 107 No-
bel Prize winners signed a letter condemning the opposition to GM technology (Washington
1
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Climate scientists who warn of climate change do not face the economic burden
of abatement the way coal miners and steel workers do.2 Researchers who certify
the safety of consumer products like cell phones are not trusted because of their
reliance on research funding from industry.3
On economic policy, Sapienza and Zingales (2013) document that informing
people about the consensus among professional economists does not always bring
their positions closer. This is especially true for issues involving distributive
conflicts like trade and immigration policy.4 Furthermore, trust in experts corre-
lates with education level and partisan affiliation, indicating that it matters how
aligned voters’ economic interests and values are with the expert’s.5
In discussions of public policy and the proper functioning of democracies, of-
ten there is disagreement. Populist voices emphasize the values and interests
of average citizens, while technocratic ones stress the importance of specialized
knowledge in solving social problems. Plato’s advocacy of rule by philosopher
kings, and Pol Pot’s persecution of the educated elite in Cambodia, are perhaps
the most extreme expressions of this conflict. But the tension is also present
in modern representative democracies. While one side accuses political parties
of being inadequately responsive to the public interest, the other side accuses
the same parties of being all too responsive and excessively poll driven, unable
to propose responsible policies based on scientific knowledge (Caramani (2017)).
How parties balance these pressures while seeking electoral success is of great
relevance for democracies. The complex challenges of globalization, automation
and climate change have given credence to the technocratic view. These same
challenges may also have generated a backlash in the form of election of populist
governments across the world.6
Post. 2016. “107 Nobel Laureates Sign Letter Blasting Greenpeace Over GMOs.” June
30. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/speaking-of-science/wp/2016/06/29/more-than-100-nobel-
laureates-take-on-greenpeace-over-gmo-stance/).
2In 2009, a global controversy was triggered by email correspondence among climate scientists that
were made public when servers at the University of East Anglia were hacked. “These e-mails show a
pattern of suppression, manipulation and secrecy that was inspired by ideology, condescension and profit,”
said Rep. James Sensenbrenner (R-Wisconsin) in the U.S. Congress. The scientific community denied the
charges (Borenstein, Seth. 2009. “Obama Science Advisers Grilled Over Hacked Emails.” Associated
Press, December 3. https://phys.org/news/2009-12-obama-science-grilled-hacked-e-mails.html).
3A critical report in the Guardian Observer says: “(L)ike the tobacco and fossil-fuel industries, the
wireless industry has “war-gamed” science...War-gaming science involves playing offence as well as de-
fence – funding studies friendly to the industry while attacking studies that raise questions; placing
industry-friendly experts on advisory bodies such as the World Health Organisation ... ” Hertsgaard,
Mark, and Mark Dowie. 2018. “The Inconvenient Truth About Cancer and Mobile Phones.” The
Guardian Observer, July 14. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jul/14/mobile-phones-
cancer-inconvenient-truths.
4While there is near consensus among economists that trade with China makes most Americans better
off, only about 20% of the general public agree with that view (Johnston and Ballard (2016)).
5Funk, Cary, Meg Hefferon, Brian Kennedy, and Courtney Johnson. 2019.“Trust
and Mistrust in Americans’ View of Scientific Experts.” Pew Research Center, August 2.
https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2019/08/02/trust-and-mistrust-in-americans-views-of-scientific-
experts/.
6Posner, Eric. 2019. “The Meritocracy Muddle.” Project Syndicate, September 13,
https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/the-meritocracy-muddle-by-eric-posner-2019-09-2.
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In this paper, we construct a framework to evaluate the role of expertise in
democracies. We also examine the role of the party system in incorporating
expert knowledge into policy making. In our framework, optimal policy is a
function both of objective information and subjective preferences. Experts do
not wield power directly but influence policy through publicly stated opinion and
advice. In doing so, they bring both their private information and their special
interest to the table. Aware of this, voters and politicians face a signal extraction
problem. To what extent is expert advice derived from the expert’s scientific
knowledge and to what extent is it shaped by her non-scientific preferences and
values?7
We present a Downsian model in which voters and an expert have state-contingent
distance-based quadratic preferences with different bliss points. Only the expert
is privately informed about the state-of-the-world and she strategically communi-
cates her information through public messages. Under representative or indirect
democracy, office seeking politicians commit to policy platforms and compete for
votes. The expert may send a public message before platforms are chosen to
influence political parties. We call this policy advocacy. The expert may also
communicate after platform choice to influence voters. We call this partisan en-
dorsements.
This framework combines in a natural way the Hotelling (1929) model of spatial
competition and the Crawford and Sobel (1982) model of strategic communication
or cheap talk. When policies are not directly chosen by the voter but mediated
by third parties (politicians), Blackwell’s theorem cannot be invoked to infer that
the social value of experts must be non-negative. As it turns out, voter wel-
fare critically depends on which form(s) of communication the expert can engage
in, policy advocacy aimed at parties or partisan endorsements aimed at voters.
Importantly, the interaction of the two forms of communication has interesting
effects.
Suppose first the expert only practices partisan endorsements. For reasons fa-
miliar from the complete information Hotelling model, electoral competition leads
to platform convergence. But the convergence is not at the expected ideal point
of the median voter. Since parties seek expert endorsements, platforms converge
closer to the expected ideal point of the expert. There is expert pandering. This
platform distortion is not counteracted by any informational gain. Neither plat-
form choice that comes before the expert speaks, nor voter choice exercised over
identical platforms, uses expert information. Consequently, the expert imposes a
net harm on the average voter.
Suppose next the expert cannot provide endorsements but can engage in policy
7A report of the House of Lords in the British Parliament acknowledges quite clearly the prob-
lems created by the bundling of information and preferences: “Some issues currently treated by
decision-makers as scientific issues in fact involve many other factors besides science. Framing the
problem wrongly by excluding moral, social, ethical and other concerns invites hostility.” House of
Lord’s UK Parliament. 2003. Third Report of the Select Committee on Science and Technology.
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldselect/ldsctech/38/3801.htm.
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advocacy. Since there is no last minute partisan endorsement to influence voter
choice, equilibrium platforms will always converge to the median voter’s optimal
policy conditional on the expert’s advice. It follows that the expert’s presence
can only benefit the median voter; strictly so if the expert speaks informatively.
What happens when the expert engages in both kinds of communication, policy
advocacy followed by partisan endorsements? Endorsements reduce voter welfare
ex post by distorting platforms. However, this distortion also encourages the
expert to engage in more informative policy advocacy. Unless the expert is ex-
tremely biased, the interaction of advocacy and endorsements creates a synergy.
Voter welfare is higher under advocacy and endorsement than under either form
of communication by itself. This synergy effect is present as long as the prefer-
ence conflict between voters and the expert is not so large as to make completely
uninformed policy choice optimal.
The intuition behind this result is related to the delegation literature for cheap
talk games (Holmstrom (1984), Dessein (2002)). An uninformed decision maker,
in deciding whether to delegate decision making to an informed but biased advisor,
faces a trade-off between tolerating distorted choices (in the case of delegation)
versus less informed choices (when relying on advice). Unless the advisor is ex-
tremely biased, the trade-off is resolved in favor of delegation. A similar force
is at play here. The expert assumes de facto decision making power through
her ability to pull electoral outcomes towards her preferred policies using her
endorsements. This incentivizes her to provide more informative policy advice
before campaigns. Most voters are better off gaining information at the cost of
policy distortion. This trade-off between the voter’s ex post and ex ante interests
is the key insight that can be leveraged to answer other questions of contemporary
relevance.
The opposing pressures of technocracy and populism have led to calls for demo-
cratic reform. From the technocratic end of the spectrum, Brennan (2016) argues
in favor of assigning different weights to voters demonstrating different levels of
policy relevant knowledge.8 From the populist end, Bovens and Wille (2017) pro-
vide evidence that governments in Europe have become increasingly dominated
by an educated elite. As an antidote, they advocate the use of direct democracy
for critical policy decisions. Matsusaka (2005) similarly favors direct democracy,
documenting a rise in the use of ballot proposals and referendums.
We take universal adult suffrage and ‘one voter one vote’ as bedrock principles.
In our framework, direct democracy generally produces lower welfare than indirect
democracy. Under direct democracy policy is chosen directly by the median
voter or a utilitarian social planner to maximize voter payoff, conditional on
any information revealed by the expert. Therefore, direct democracy is outcome
8This echoes Mill’s (1861) concern about the tradeoff between competence and participation in democ-
racies. This concern led him to propose allocating six votes each to lawyers on the ground that lawyers
are better able to evaluate complex policy proposals. While this idea of knowledge based voting is some-
times called epistocracy, we treat this and other similar ideas (such as Plato’s noocracy or rule by a
philosopher king) as rough synonyms for what we mean by technocracy in the context of this paper.
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equivalent to indirect democracy, but when the expert engages only in policy
advocacy without any partisan endorsements. Exactly when the interaction of
advocacy and endorsements creates synergies, indirect democracy with advocacy
and endorsements is better than direct democracy for a majority of voters.
The dominance of indirect democracy underscores the importance of political
parties. It is the office motive of political parties that leads to expert pander-
ing, creating the synergy gains from advocacy and endorsement. If politicians
were committed to the public interest, there would be no platform distortion.
Consequently, voter welfare would be lower.
This benefit of office seeking parties does not however imply that it is the ideal
institution from the perspective of voters. We show that the ideal institution
consists of political competition between two ideological parties, each of a partic-
ular sort. One party is technocratic and captured by the expert. Consequently,
it shares her information and policy goals. The other party is uninformed but
populist, i.e., motivated to maximize the median voter’s welfare. Electoral compe-
tition between these two parties yields the optimal mechanism in our framework.
The optimal mechanism takes the form of capped delegation, first identified by
Holmstrom (1984). The expert gets her ideal policy subject to a pre-specified
bound or cap. In terms of our game of electoral competition, the technocratic
party proposes the expert’s ideal policy and quite often gets elected. But when
the expert’s information is extreme, and in the direction of her ideological conflict
with the average voter, the populist platform is preferred by a majority and it is
the one that is elected. The probability of the populist winning is increasing in
the expert’s conflict with the median voter.
In a stylized way, this variant of our baseline model captures the increased elite
dominance of mainstream political parties (Bovens and Wille (2017)) and the
emerging populist challenge from the likes of UKIP, National Front and Donald
Trump. The resultant polarization has attracted much negative commentary.9 We
offer a different perspective. Technocracy, operating under the shadow of a pop-
ulist threat, may offer voters the best prospect for harnessing expert knowledge.
It maximizes ex ante average voter welfare.
Overall, our analysis shows that the widely discussed tradeoff between tech-
nocracy and populism may be a false one. Indirect democracy operating under
expert influence has desirable welfare properties. It aggregates expert information
better than public spirited decision making, leading to policies that better serve
the average voter’s ex ante interests.
This conclusion needs three key ingredients. First, for expertise to improve
democratic outcomes, it is necessary that experts have a long term engagement
with the political process, conveying their opinion about the intrinsic merits of
different policies and shaping the political agenda before elections, not merely
throwing their support behind particular parties and candidates late in the game.
Experts must engage in public debate on both policy and politics. This impor-
9See Posner (2019), supra footnote 6.
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tance of expert engagement is underscored by the fact that voters get the best
possible institutional arrangement when the expert goes beyond mere speeches
and actually controls a party competing against a populist rival.
Second, even when the expert only makes public speeches, the institution
of narrowly office seeking parties has a commitment role in aggregating policy
relevant information. To reap this commitment benefit, it is important for the
parties to commit to specific policy platforms rather than commit merely to a
policy stance by nominating a candidate with the appropriate ideology. In the
latter case, we show that electoral competition leads to convergence on candidates
who share the median voter’s preference, and who therefore do not pander to
experts to elicit more information from them. Programmatic politics dominates
personality centered politics in our framework.10
The assumption that experts have an incentive to exaggerate is the third key
ingredient of our analysis. Expert pandering by office seeking parties creates value
for voters exactly because it improves the expert’s incentive constraints, allowing
her to credibly reveal better information. When the expert can credibly commit
to an information revelation policy (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)), we show
that this force is reversed. Because political parties choose policies that serve
the expert’s ideological interests to a greater extent, the expert prefers to hide
at least some information under indirect democracy in order to obtain policies
that favor her. Under direct democracy, the expert would commit to revealing
all her information, a better outcome for voters. Indirect democracy is the better
institution only if voters are concerned about the expert’s credibility and her
incentive to exaggerate.
The themes that we explore in this paper have roots in antiquity. But they
are also important strands of current public debates. Before the Brexit refer-
endum, there was a strong consensus among both institutional bodies (like the
British Treasury, IMF and OECD) and individual experts that leaving the Euro-
pean Union would have a negative impact on the British economy.11 Yet, Boris
Johnson derided such predictions as “Project Fear” and Michael Gove declared,
“This country has had enough of experts.”12 The results of the 2016 referendum
vindicated Gove and Johnson. At the same time, David Cameron’s decision to
hold the Brexit referendum was labelled by critics as “Russian roulette for re-
10The difference between platform commitment versus a policy stance is reminiscent of Burke’s (1774)
distinction between “delegate” versus “trustee” modes of representation. A delegate faithfully implements
his pre-election pledges while a trustee can use his judgment and opinion to decide on actual policy
once elected. In our model, the delegate mode of representation is better for voters. It provides more
commitment to the voter and aggregates more information from the expert.
11Sodha, Sonia, Toby Helm, and Phillip Inman. 2016). “Economists Over-
whelmingly Reject Brexit in Boost for Cameron.” The Guardian Observer, May 28.
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/28/economists-reject-brexit-boost-cameron.
12Gove’s claim was not unfounded. A 2016 YouGov poll found that among Leave voters, the net
trust of economists (proportion saying they trust economists minus those who say they don’t) was neg-
ative 36%. See https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/16/eu-referendum-leave-supporters-trust-
ordinary-common-sense-than/. This relatively recent trust deficit is a reversal of the earlier critical
role economists played in the spread of trade liberalization and economic integration across the globe,
starting from around 1980 (Fairbrother (2014)).
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publics.”13 Interestingly, as of late 2019, 57% of the British public believed the
issue should have been settled through the parliamentary route rather than a ref-
erendum.14 Consistent with this paper, there was skepticism of experts but also
of direct democracy as a solution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I we present our bench-
mark model of indirect democracy with office seeking parties operating under the
influence of expert advice and endorsements. We also compare welfare across al-
ternative institutions and environments. Section II analyzes the case of an expert
captured informed technocratic party competing against an uninformed populist
party. Section III reviews the related literature while Section IV contains our
concluding remarks. All proofs and ancillary results are in the Appendix.
I. Indirect democracy under expert influence
A. Players, preferences and information
A unit mass of voters, indexed by b ∈ [−1, 1], face an uncertain state of the
economy captured by a random variable y ∈ [0, 1], where y follows the uniform
distribution. The utility of voter b in state y from a policy x ∈ R is given by a
quadratic loss function
(1) u (x; y, b) = − (y + b− x)2 .
Thus, the ideal policy of voter b in state y is y+ b, where b is the voter’s ideolog-
ical bias. Let G be the (atomless) distribution of voters when they are ordered
according to their ideology and normalize so that bmv = 0 is the ideology of the
median voter.
Policies are not directly chosen by the voters. Instead they are determined via
electoral competition. Two office-seeking parties commit to platforms xL and xR
respectively that they will implement if elected to office. The parties do not know
the realization of y and neither do any of the voters, except for one, the expert.
The expert, with ideological bias be > 0, privately learns the realization of y. The
two political parties and all voters hold uniform priors about y.15
The expert can publicly communicate with the electorate and with the parties
via cheap talk. We allow for two stages of communication. The first stage of
communication takes place before the parties have made their platform choices.
We call this the policy advocacy stage and denote the expert’s message at this
13Rogoff, Kenneth. 2016. “Britain’s Democratic Failure.” Project Syndicate, June
24. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/brexit-democratic-failure-for-uk-by-kenneth-rogoff-
2016-06/.
14Helm, Toby. 2019. “Brexit Referendum Should Never Have Been Called, Say A Majority of
Voters.” The Guardian, October 26. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/oct/26/opinium-poll-
observer-uk-voters-regret-brexit-referendum-conservative-lead-over-labour.
15In what follows, we focus on the case be < 1/2. If be ≥ 1/2, the expert’s presence has no effect
on outcomes. Equilibria are identical to the classical Hoteling-Downs model without any informed voter
and both parties locate at the expected ideal policy of the median voter.
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Figure 1. Timing of moves.
stage by ma.
16 The message ma may contain information about the state y and
influence the platform choices of the parties and the subsequent voting behavior
of the electorate.
The second stage of communication takes place after the parties have committed
to their platforms but before voters vote. We call this the endorsement stage and
denote the corresponding message by me. Since me arrives after parties have
committed to platforms, endorsements can only affect the behavior of voters,
although anticipated future endorsements can affect platforms. In the final stage
of the game, each voter votes in favor of her preferred platform after taking
into account all available information. The party that wins a majority of votes
is elected and implements its platform. Ties in votes are resolved uniformly.17
The equilibrium notion is perfect Bayesian equilibrium with some restrictions
that we detail below. Figure 1 describes the timing structure of our model of
representative or indirect democracy operating under the influence of an informed
expert.
This simple model of electoral competition among two office seeking parties
differs from the canonical Hotelling-Downs framework in two ways. First, we
introduce an uncertain state of the world that is relevant to determine the ideal
policies of all voters. Second, we suppose that one particular voter, the expert, is
privately informed about this state. The expert only uses public communication
to influence the electoral process but does not directly control any other aspect
of the elections. So this is a model of indirect expert capture, in contrast with a
model of direct expert capture of policy making by one or both political parties
or any other institution.18
While we model the expert as a single agent, this assumption should not be
taken literally. The expert in our model represents a particular interest group,
such as the scientific community or an elite who have an informational advantage
over the average voter and are able to exploit this advantage because of their
access to scientific journals and media outlets. A common theme heard both
from the left and the right about the functioning of modern democracies is that
16As is standard in cheap talk games, messages have no intrinsic cost or benefit associated with them
or even any meaning. Rather, meaning is derived in equilibrium after taking into account incentives. We
assume that the underlying message space is rich enough so that information transmission is constrained
only by incentives and not by the availability of messages.
17This simplifies the exposition. Assuming uniform tie breaking does not affect our conclusions. In
many cases, it is a necessary property of any equilibrium.
18We consider a version of such direct capture of a political party by the expert in Section II.
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its proper operation is distorted by the concerted actions of an ideologically biased
elite. Our formulation allows us to evaluate this kind of critique in its bleakest
form.19 We also assume the expert’s information can only be revealed through
unverifiable cheap talk and not through voluntary public disclosure of verifiable
information (Milgrom (1981)). This seems to be the appropriate assumption if
the relevant information is highly technical in nature whose implications can be
understood only by those who have specialized training and education. We now
present a lemma that will be useful throughout the paper.
LEMMA 1: Fix xL, xR. If the median voter strictly prefers one platform given
all available information, then so does a majority of voters.
Lemma 1 states that it is enough to focus on the behavior of the median voter
to determine electoral outcomes.20 This is true not only under the institution of
indirect democracy described above, but also under alternative institutions that
we consider below, such as direct democracy or indirect democracy with more
restricted communication possibilities than in the main model.
B. Two benchmarks
The fundamental goal of this paper is to understand the effect of experts and
office seeking political parties on voter welfare. To evaluate these effects, we need
to construct benchmarks where either the expert or the political parties are absent
from the setup. We discuss these two benchmarks in this section, returning to
the main model of indirect democracy outlined above in the next section.
In our first benchmark, there is no expert. Uninformed office-seeking parties
simultaneously propose platforms. Then voters cast their votes.
BENCHMARK 1: (Uninformed democracy) Suppose there is no expert. In the
unique equilibrium both parties locate at E[y] = 1/2, the ex ante expected ideal
policy of the median voter.
When there is no expert, both parties locate at the unconditional mean of the
state y, the expected ideal policy of the median voter. This follows immediately
from Lemma 1 and standard logic familiar from the Hotelling-Downs model un-
der complete information. The median voter’s expected payoff is equal to (the
19As we show, even with a monopolist expert the overall welfare effect of indirect capture is quite
beneficial for voters because the electoral process results in significant information revelation. With
multiple ideologically distinct and competing groups of experts, this information revelation effect should
only be enhanced (see, e.g., Krishna and Morgan (2001)). For instance, with three or more experts with
the same information, speaking simultaneously, full revelation is an equilibrium. If the public ignores a
dissenting minority opinion, no expert has an incentive to deviate. We look at the worst case scenario
from the perspective of average voter welfare.
20For general twice continuously differentiable preferences u (x; y, b), Lemma 1 obtains if u13 > 0. In
our setting where the state y and ideology b enter the utility function in the additive form y + b, this is
identical to the condition u12 > 0, a sorting condition used to generate informative communication. See,
e.g., Crawford and Sobel (1982).
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negative of) the unconditional variance of y. We call this benchmark uninformed
democracy. Its outcome is the classical median voter theorem, adjusted to account
for uncertainty.
In what follows, we will consider many alternative institutions (direct democ-
racy, indirect democracy, etc.) and for each institution we will define the social
value of expertise. When the expected payoff to the median voter under any
given institution is greater than that under uninformed democracy, we will say
the social value of expertise for that institution is positive. If the median voter
is worse off compared to uninformed democracy, the social value of expertise for
that institution is negative.
We define the social value of expertise in terms of the median voter’s welfare
for the following reasons. Under our specification of voter preferences, when the
median voter prefers one institution to another (e.g., indirect democracy over
direct democracy), so will a strict majority of voters. Only a minority may
prefer the alternative institution. Evaluating different institutions according to
the median voter’s welfare corresponds to a majoritarian welfare criterion. In
addition, as long as the mean of the distribution G of voter ideologies equals its
median, the utilitarian sum of ex ante voter welfare equals the median voter’s
welfare less a constant equal to the variance of voter ideologies according to G.
In these cases, using the median voter’s payoff as our welfare criterion is the same
as the utilitarian welfare criterion.21 For these reasons and also Lemma 1, we will
track the median voter’s behavior and welfare in what follows, often referring to
the median voter simply as the voter.
We now introduce our second benchmark. In this benchmark, the expert is
present but political parties are absent. The informed expert sends a public
cheap talk message after which the median voter directly chooses a policy. We
will call this direct democracy. This scenario will obtain when the median voter
is the mean voter and policy choice is determined not through electoral competi-
tion but by a utilitarian planner. Alternatively, following Osborne and Slivinski
(1996), consider a citizen-candidate model preceded by expert cheap talk where
the cost of running for office and the intrinsic benefit of being elected are small
and comparable to each other. The median voter emerges as an uncontested
winner in such a scenario.22
The equilibrium outcome of direct democracy corresponds to that of the Craw-
ford and Sobel (1982, henceforth CS) game of strategic information transmission
between an expert and a decision-maker who in this case is the voter. For ease of
reference, we describe the key properties of equilibrium outcomes for this bench-
mark that we will use.
21If one allows additive transfers, then using the utilitarian criterion is equivalent to using the Pareto
criterion.
22In Osborne and Slivinski (1996, Propositions 1 and 2), office is sought not by professional politicians
but by citizen candidates who are primarily motivated by the desire to affect policy outcomes. Citizens
have a cost of running for office and an intrinsic benefit of being elected themselves, in addition to policy
payoffs.
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Figure 2. Direct democracy.
BENCHMARK 2: (Direct democracy) Suppose there are no parties and policies
are chosen to maximize voter welfare after communicating with the expert. The
expert is informative if and only if be < 1/4. The social value of expertise is
positive when the expert is informative and zero otherwise.
Under direct democracy the expert cannot credibly reveal the exact value of y.
For if she is expected to do so, the chosen policy will equal the expert’s stated
value of y. This cannot be an equilibrium since be > 0 and the expert then has
an incentive to overstate the value of y in order to get policies that are closer
to her own ideal policy. In equilibrium, the expert can only credibly transmit
coarse information, revealing for each state an interval in which the state lies.
The number, size and location of these intervals is determined by be, the conflict
of interest between the expert and the voter.
As shown in CS, the number of intervals N is finite and in our setting the expert
is informative (N > 1) if and only if be < 1/4. Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 2
for the case where be = 1/16. In the ex ante payoff optimal equilibrium for the
voter (and the expert), the expert reveals in which of three intervals the state
belongs: [0, 1/12], [1/12, 5/12], or [5/12, 1]. The voter chooses actions 1/24, 1/4
or 17/24, equal to the expectation of the state conditional on the message, once
he learns the relevant interval.23
Since the payoff of the voter is maximized conditional on any information com-
ing from the expert, by Blackwell’s theorem, he cannot be worse off ex ante,
compared to our previous benchmark of uninformed democracy. The social value
of expertise under direct democracy cannot be negative. It is positive whenever
the expert reveals non-trivial information.
While the social value of expertise is always non-negative under direct democ-
racy, voter welfare is lower than the symmetric information case where the state y
is common knowledge. The credibility constraints of the expert create two kinds
of informational (and welfare) loss. First, information is coarsened, as captured
by the partitioning of the state space by the expert’s message. Second, the coars-
ening is not uniform. There is an inflation in interval size, i.e., greater coarsening,
23For fixed be, there are many interval cheap talk equilibria, but the one with the highest number of
intervals is the ex ante optimal one from the perspective of all voters. Following the literature, we select
this equilibrium in what follows. Given our assumptions, the exact intervals for this equilibrium can be
found via the difference equation li+1 = li + 4be, where li is the length of the i-th interval, using the
boundary condition that the interval lengths sum up to 1.
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as one moves in the direction of bias. Coarsening and inflation both reduce voter
welfare below the symmetric information case.
As we show below, indirect democracy shares these sources of welfare loss. Be-
cause of intermediation by the political parties, it may also give rise to policies
that are not necessarily equal to the voter’s ideal given all available information.
Consequently, Blackwell’s theorem cannot be invoked. The social value of ex-
pertise takes into account the value of the information obtained from the expert
net of the average cost of policy distortion away from what the voter would like.
It can be either positive or negative under indirect democracy. We turn to our
analysis of this institution now.
C. Endorsements and platforms
In this section we solve for what happens at the endorsement stage when plat-
forms are chosen and endorsed by the expert, assuming voters have interval beliefs
after the advocacy message ma. In the next section we roll back to the advocacy
stage and describe the equilibria of the full game. Subsequently, we evaluate the
welfare of voters and the expert.
Suppose that after hearing the advocacy message ma, voters and parties hold in-
terval beliefs on the distribution of y, i.e., y is believed to be uniformly distributed
over a sub-interval [yl, yh] ⊆ [0, 1]. Suppose further that the contesting parties
have chosen platforms xL, xR with xL ≤ xR. Let xmid be the midpoint of the two
platforms. Our next result describes the effect of the expert’s second message me
on voting behavior. It identifies conditions under which the expert is influential,
i.e., her endorsement affects voting outcomes. We use this result subsequently to
characterize the equilibrium platform choices by the political parties.
LEMMA 2: Suppose the expert has revealed an interval [yl, yh] that contains y
with her advocacy message ma. Suppose also xL < xR. If the expert’s second
message me influences voting, it can only reveal the platform the expert prefers,
i.e., whether y > xmid − be or y < xmid − be; and the platform the expert prefers
is elected. An influential endorsement equilibrium exists if and only if xmid ∈
(yl + be, yh − be]. When me is not influential, the platform closest to E[y|ma] is
elected regardless of me.
Lemma 2 is a standard result for binary action cheap talk games. When the
message me influences voting behavior, the expert has an incentive to send the
message that elects the expert’s more favored platform. Voters account for this
incentive and so the message me can only convey the expert’s preferences to the
voter, i.e., whether or not y > xmid − be.
Lemma 2 identifies the interval (yl + be, yh − be] as the expert’s “zone of in-
fluence”, depicted in Figure 3. When the midpoint of the two policy platforms,
xmid, lies in the zone of influence, the expert will endorse either platform with
positive probability and her endorsement determines the electoral outcome. For
the expert to prefer (and endorse) both candidates with positive probability we
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Figure 3. Expert’s zone of influence.
must have xmid > yl + be. If this is violated the expert cannot be informative
(or influential) since she prefers the right platform regardless of the state. An
expert endorsement for the right platform influences a majority if and only if
E[y|y > xmid − be] ≥ xmid, equivalently, xmid < yh − be. We assume throughout
that the influential equilibrium is played whenever it exists.24
We turn now to the determination of equilibrium platform choices. Let r(ma) =
yh−yl measure the residual uncertainty about the state faced by the general public
after the first message ma. Lemma 3 shows that this residual uncertainty is a key
determinant of equilibrium platforms.
LEMMA 3: Suppose the expert has revealed an interval [yl, yh] that contains y
with her advocacy message ma. Suppose also that whenever an influential en-
dorsement equilibrium exists, it is played. Then the unique equilibrium outcome
in platform choice involves the two parties choosing a common policy platform,
xL = xR = x
∗ given by:
(2) x∗ =
 E[y|ma] + be if r(ma) ≥ 4be (expert pandering)yh − be if 2be < r(ma) < 4be (partial pandering)
E[y|ma] if r(ma) ≤ 2be (voter pandering)
Platform convergence occurs for essentially the same reason as in the classical
median voter theorem. Suppose xL 6= xR. If the expert’s endorsement is in-
fluential, the party which is winning with probability less than 1/2 can gain by
matching its platform with the other party’s platform. If, on the other hand, the
expert’s endorsement is not influential, the right party wins with zero probability,
which implies it has a profitable deviation to the other party’s platform. Since
the two parties play a zero sum game, it follows that this is the unique outcome
in platform choice, under the conditions of Lemma 3.
Where do platforms converge to? Whether parties pander to the median voter
or the expert depends on the residual uncertainty r about the state y. Greater
24In any cheap talk game, there is always a babbling equilibrium where voters refuse to ascribe
any meaning to the message me and so the expert can do no better than be uninformative. When
endorsements are credible, an influential equilibrium also exists and it yields higher expected payoff to
both the expert and the voter, conditional on ma and the platforms. We select the Pareto dominant
influential equilibrium of the continuation game. In the statement of Lemma 2 we also break ties by
assuming that the voter follows the expert’s advice when she is indifferent. This is in the spirit of selecting
the efficient outcome and does not affect our results. We discuss the equilbrium set in more detail later
in the paper.
14 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MONTH YEAR
Figure 4. Paltforms, uncertainty and bias.
uncertainty leads to equilibrium platforms being pulled closer to the expert’s
ideal policy rather than the median voter’s. Figure 4(a) depicts the relationship
between the degree of uncertainty r and the common equilibrium platform x∗, for
fixed bias of the expert. Figure 4(b) plots the common equilibrium platform x∗
as a function of the expert’s bias be, for fixed uncertainty about the state.
25
To understand Figure 4(a), recall that the expert’s endorsements are influential
if and only if the midpoint of the two platforms lies in the expert’s zone of influence
(yl + be, yh − be]. If the residual uncertainty about the state is small enough
(r ≤ 2be), the zone of influence is empty. In this case, both parties will pander
to the voter and locate at E[y|ma]. If any party deviates towards the expert, the
expert’s endorsement for that party will not be influential and so its rival will win
the election for sure. At the other extreme, when the uncertainty about the state
is large enough (r ≥ 4be), both the median voter’s and the expert’s expected ideal
policies lie in the zone of influence. An expert endorsement for any party decides
the election. In this case both parties pander completely to the expert.
In the intermediate case (2be < r < 4be), the voter’s expected ideal policy lies
in the zone of influence while the expert’s expected ideal point lies to its right. In
this case, parties will choose platforms at the right edge of the zone of influence,
i.e., at yh− be. If a party moves its platform further right, it breaches the zone of
influence and an endorsement in its favor will not translate into electoral victory,
so parties pander to the expert subject to remaining in the zone.
The relationship between uncertainty about the state and the degree of expert
(or voter) pandering depicted in Figure 4(a) plays a key role in the analysis of
the next section where we describe the strategic considerations affecting policy
advocacy by the expert. Fixing this uncertainty, Figure 4(b) depicts a non-
monotonicity in the expert’s influence on policy as a function of her bias. For
25In Figure 4(a) , we set yl =
1
2
− r
2
and yh =
1
2
+ r
2
, so that E[y] = 1
2
and vary r = yh − yl, fixing
be = 1/4. In Figure 4(b) , we fix [yl, yh] = [0, 1] and vary be ∈ [0, 1/2].
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small be, both parties pander to the expert. If the expert’s bias increases slightly,
equilibrium platforms move further away from what is ideal for the median voter.
The voter’s welfare is decreasing in the expert’s bias in this zone. For larger
values of be however, the voter’s welfare is increasing in the expert’s bias. This is
because highly biased experts struggle to issue credible endorsements, reducing
the incentive of political parties to pander to them, reverting platforms closer to
the voter’s ideal policy. Experts lose influence when they desire to change the
course of public policy substantially rather than modestly, making such ambitions
self-defeating. Experts of intermediate bias exert the most distortionary influence
on policies and impose the most harm on the average voter.
Using lemma 3 we now describe the equilibrium outcome of indirect democracy
when the expert’s public communication is limited only to partisan endorsements.
PROPOSITION 1: (Endorsements only) Consider the truncated game where the
expert cannot send the advocacy message ma at the beginning. She sends only the
endorsement message me after platforms are chosen. In equilibrium, the common
policy platform, xL = xR = x
∗ is given by
(3) x∗ =
{
1
2 + be if be ≤ 14 (expert pandering)
1− be if 14 < be < 12 (partial pandering)
The social value of expertise is negative. But the expert prefers this outcome to
that of uninformed democracy.
Proposition 1 is a restatement of Lemma 3 for the special case where [yl, yh] ≡
[0, 1]. Even when the expert only sends endorsements, there is a potential chan-
nel for incorporating expert information into policy choices. But this requires
the creation of a non-trivial menu of policy choices for voters through platform
differentiation. Unfortunately, due to platform convergence in response to elec-
toral incentives, there is no such choice for the voter and so endorsements cannot
produce any useful information in equilibrium.
The expert still exerts a distortionary effect on platforms. Her ability to influ-
ence choices off-the-equilibrium-path allows the expert to move policy towards her
own expected ideal. This is why the expert prefers this outcome to that under
uninformed democracy described by Benchmark 1. But the social value of exper-
tise is negative. The voter’s welfare is driven below its level under uninformed
democracy.
D. Policy advocacy
Consider now the expert’s first period policy advocacy messagema. We describe
first a benchmark where the expert sends only the advocacy message ma before
party platforms are chosen. She is not allowed to send the second endorsement
message me after platforms are chosen.
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After every such message ma, it is not difficult to see that both the parties will
locate at E[y|ma], the expected ideal policy of the voter given ma. This is the
unique equilibrium in platform choices for each ma.
26 From the expert’s perspec-
tive, it is as if she faces a decision maker who chooses the policy that maximizes
the welfare of the voter after each message ma. The resulting communication
game is outcome equivalent to direct democracy.
PROPOSITION 2: (Advocacy only) Consider the truncated game where the ex-
pert cannot send the endorsement message me after platforms are chosen. She
sends only the advocacy message ma at the beginning. The equilibrium coincides
with that under direct democracy and the social value of expertise is non-negative.
With this last benchmark in place, we turn now to the equilibrium of our full
model where the expert can engage both in policy advocacy before platforms
are chosen as well as platform endorsements after parties commit to platforms.
The full game of electoral competition with multi-stage cheap talk has a large
multiplicity of equilibria. We focus on equilibria where the expert’s first period
messaging strategy takes an interval partitional form. Lemma 3 shows that plat-
forms must converge after a message ma that reveals an interval for y. They
converge to the policies identified by Lemma 3 as long as we select the informa-
tive equilibrium at the endorsement stage whenever it exists, for every possible
pair of platform choices.
In what follows, we refer to equilibria with these two restrictions, (a) advocacy
takes an interval partitional form and (b) endorsements are influential whenever
they are credible, simply as equilibria. These restrictions limit our freedom to
select between different kinds of endorsement equilibria made in order to support
particular outcomes of the overall game of electoral competition. As a conse-
quence, we do not necessarily select the ex ante payoff optimal equilibrium, either
for the expert or for the other voters. In this sense, we understate the benefits of
expert influence on electoral competition from the perspective of voter welfare.27
In the equilibria of the full model with advocacy and endorsements, the expert
faces similar incentive problems as under the benchmark of direct democracy (or,
CS). For instance, the expert cannot fully reveal her information. For if she is ex-
pected to do so, there will be no residual uncertainty at the platform endorsement
stage. In accordance with Lemma 3, the parties will not pander to the expert,
26The reasoning is identical to that for Benchmark 1 (and Lemma 3, for the case r(ma) ≤ 2be).
Since the expert cannot send any information after platforms are chosen, the parties must locate at the
expected ideal policy of the voter given all available information.
27Our selection rule is in the spirit of restrictions usually imposed in the literature on cheap talk games
such as NITS (Chen, Kartik and Sobel, (2008)), but applied iteratively at each stage of a multi-stage
communication game. See Chakraborty and Ghosh (2016), Argenziano, Severinov, and Squintani (2016)
for other models where selecting the payoff-dominant equilibria at later stages of communication games
does not necessarily select the ex ante payoff dominant equilibrium outcome. In the Appendix, we provide
examples of equilibria where advocacy takes a non-interval partitional form. We also illustrate how to
generate a large multiplicity of equilibria by suitably selecting between different kinds of continuation
equilibria at the endorsement stage.
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choosing instead policies that are equal to the voter’s ideal. But then the expert
will have an incentive to overstate the realized value of the state. Just like under
direct democracy, under indirect democracy the expert can only credibly disclose
coarse information. But there is an additional incentive effect. The coarser the
information revealed, the more the parties pander to the expert because of the
threat of subsequent expert endorsements. This pandering mitigates the incentive
of the expert to hide information under indirect democracy. It is the key differ-
ence between indirect and direct democracy with respect to the expert’s strategic
incentives.
The next result identifies the most informative equilibrium under indirect democ-
racy, i.e., the one with the highest number of intervals. To present the result
concisely, define N̂ ≥ 0 to be the integer part of 1/4be and let R = 1 − 4beN̂ be
the “remainder.” Note 0 ≤ R < 4be.
PROPOSITION 3: (Advocacy with endorsements) Suppose the expert provides
both policy advocacy and platform endorsements and that the policy advocacy
message ma discloses an interval [ci−1, ci] that contains y, i = 1, ..., N , with
0 = c0 < c1 < ... < cN = 1. Suppose also that at the endorsement stage, an
influential equilibrium is played whenever it exists. Such interval equilibria exist
and there is a finite upper bound N∗(be) ≥ 1 on the number of intervals N . When
be >
1
3 , N
∗(be) = 1 and policy advocacy is uninformative. Otherwise, N∗(be) > 1
and policy advocacy is informative. Ex ante, the expert and the voter prefer an
equilibrium with N intervals to one with N ′ < N intervals. The most informative
equilibrium with N∗(be) number of intervals is given by the following:
1) If R > 3be then N
∗(be) = N̂ + 2 with cutoffs c1 = 23R − 2be, c2 = R, and
ci = ci−1 + 4be, i ≥ 3.
2) If 2be ≤ R ≤ 3be then N∗(be) = N̂+1 with cutoffs c1 = R and ci = ci−1+4be,
i ≥ 2.
3) If R < 2be then N
∗(be) = N̂ + 1 with cutoffs c1 = 23 (R+ be), c2 = R+ 4be,
and ci = ci−1 + 4be, i ≥ 3.
Proposition 3 completely characterizes the partition corresponding to the most
informative equilibrium, as a function of the expert’s ideological bias be. For each
interval revealed by the expert with her advocacy message ma, the parties choose
common platforms in accordance with Lemma 3. Figure 5 depicts the case where
be = 1/16 so that N
∗(be) = 5.
In the equilibrium depicted in Figure 5, the left most interval is the smallest,
with length 1/24 which is less than 2be. Consistent with Lemma 3, both the
parties locate at 1/48, the expected ideal policy of the median voter conditional on
the expert’s policy advocacy message that reveals y ∈ [0, 1/24]. The next interval
to the right is larger and of length in between 2be and 4be. In this interval, both
parties locate at 3/16 which is the right boundary of the expert’s zone of influence
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Figure 5. Advocacy & endorsements.
conditional on y belonging to this interval. All remaining intervals starting from
the third from the left interval are each of length exactly 4be. In each such interval,
both parties fully pander to the expert and locate at the expected ideal policy of
the expert given that the state y lies in that interval, as depicted in the figure.
The most informative interval equilibrium with N∗ ≥ 2 always has the qualita-
tive features depicted in Figure 5. As be falls, the number of intervals N
∗ rises.
The left-most interval is the smallest. In this interval, the parties locate either
at the voter’s expected ideal point, or partially pander to the expert by locating
at the right edge of the expert’s zone of influence. The second from left interval
is larger than the left-most interval. The parties either partially or fully pander
to the expert in this interval. When N∗ ≥ 3, every interval further to the right
is exactly of length 4be. The parties pander fully to the expert in every such
interval.
The fact that the intervals are weakly larger in size, as one moves from left
to right, is a property of all equilibria and not only the most informative one.28
But this inflation stops once an interval length crosses 4be and platforms pander
fully to the expert. From this point on, there is effectively no conflict between
the expert and the ‘as if’ decision maker (the two pandering parties). For this
reason, all intervals from the third one onwards must display expert pandering.
In the full model of indirect democracy described by Proposition 3, the social
value of expertise may be positive or negative. Voter welfare may be as low as
when the expert only sends endorsements, or higher than when the expert only
engages in advocacy, or it may be somewhere in between. If voter welfare is
higher than the best of what the voter can get when the expert engages in only
one of the two forms of communication, then advocacy and endorsements acting
in concert exhibit a positive synergy. This synergy is the key determinant of the
social value of expertise under indirect democracy, as we show next.
28This property says that the expert can credibly reveal less precise information the more her infor-
mation favors her bias. The inflation in interval size occurs for the same reason as in CS. Since be > 0
and the bliss point c + be of an indifferent type c (located at the border of two adjacent intervals) must
equal the mid-point of the policies for those two intervals, interval sizes must grow (weakly). See the
proof of Proposition 3 for details of the necessary properties of all equilibria.
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E. Welfare
The comparison of voter welfare between direct and indirect democracy hinges
on a trade-off between informed decisions and distorted decisions. This trade-off
is shown in Figure 6 for the same choice of be = 1/16 used in Figures 2 and 5.
The top panel of the figure depicts the most informative equilibrium under direct
democracy while the bottom panel depicts the same for indirect democracy.
Comparing the two figures, we see that there is better information transmis-
sion by the expert under indirect democracy— while the equilibrium under direct
democracy partitions the state into three intervals, the equilibrium under indi-
rect democracy partitions it into five smaller intervals. But this improvement in
information transmission comes at a cost to the voter. Under indirect democracy,
platforms are distorted away from what the voter would like and towards what
the expert would like for all but the left most interval. Under direct democracy,
policies are always optimal for the voter for each message of the expert. The next
result compares the two institutions from the perspective of voter welfare.
PROPOSITION 4: The following statements are equivalent:
(a) Indirect democracy is better than direct democracy.
(b) Advocacy acting together with endorsements is better than either form of
communication alone.
(c) The social value of expertise under indirect democracy is positive.
(d) The expert’s bias be <
5
18 .
In the Appendix we show that statement (a) is equivalent to statement (d).
Here we establish the other claims. First, consider the equivalence of (a) and
(b). From Proposition 1, the social value of expertise is negative when the expert
only engages in platform endorsements. From Proposition 2, the social value of
expertise is non-negative when the expert only engages in policy advocacy. So,
when the expert engages in only one form of communication, voter welfare is
higher under policy advocacy and, further, the outcome is equivalent to direct
democracy. It follows that (b) is equivalent to a comparison of voter welfare
under indirect and direct democracy, namely (a).
Next, consider the equivalence of (a) and (c). Since the social value of expertise
is non-negative under direct democracy, when (a) holds the social value of exper-
tise under indirect democracy must be positive. So (a) implies (c). In the other
direction, when (a) does not obtain and direct democracy is the better institution,
since (a) is equivalent to (d), we must have be > 5/18. But then be > 1/4 and,
further, via Benchmark 2, the social value of expertise must be zero under direct
democracy. It follows the social value of expertise must be negative under the
inferior institution of indirect democracy. So (c) implies (a).
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Figure 6. Indirect vs. direct democracy.
The equivalence between (a) and (b) directly links the two institutions of di-
rect and indirect democracy with the two forms of communication, advocacy and
endorsements. Precisely when the interaction of advocacy with endorsements un-
der indirect democracy creates a positive synergy, indirect democracy dominates
direct democracy. The equivalence between (b) and (c) further clarifies matters.
The synergy is the only reason why the social value of expertise under indirect
democracy can be positive.
The equivalence between (a) and (c) is the most instructive. It tells us that
whenever the social value of expertise is positive under indirect democracy, it must
be larger than the social value of expertise under direct democracy, no matter
how large the latter is. This makes indirect democracy the better institution to
adopt. For biases so large that indirect democracy is harmful, the best option
is to expunge expertise altogether and resort to uninformed policy choices based
on priors. Direct democracy is outcome equivalent to uninformed democracy
in these cases. It is as if the institution of indirect democracy is designed to
extract information from the expert. Voters will only want to give up on indirect
democracy when they want to give up on acquiring information.
Proposition 4 drives home the important role played by electoral competition
among office seeking politicians, as opposed to public spirited decision makers
or direct citizen participation in policy making. The agency problem latent in
representative democracy may actually help to counteract the welfare loss arising
from expert bias and informational manipulation. It does so by providing a de
facto delegation instrument to voters, who can leverage the pandering motive of
politicians to partially commit to policy choices serving the expert’s interests,
thereby inducing him to reveal more.
As noted by Holmstrom (1984) and Dessein (2002), partial or complete dele-
gation of decision making authority to an informed expert serves the interest of
an uninformed receiver of information unless the bias is too high. In our model,
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Figure 7. Voter’s ranking of institutions.
electoral competition serves in effect as the delegation mechanism, albeit an im-
perfect one. Since the expert can influence policy making only through public
speeches, the delegation benefits in our model fall short of the benefits of optimal
delegation identified by Holmstrom (1984).29
Figure 7 provides the ranking of alternative institutions from the perspective
of voter welfare as a function of the conflict be. Consistent with Proposition 4,
indirect democracy is the top choice of the voter when be < 5/18, while direct
democracy is the best institution when be > 5/18. At be = 5/18, the benefit of
informative advocacy exactly offsets the cost of policy distortions caused by the
threat of platform endorsements and the social value of expertise under indirect
democracy equals zero.
Direct democracy, which is identical to the advocacy only benchmark, is unin-
formative and coincides with uninformed democracy when be > 1/4. Similarly, in-
direct democracy coincides with the endorsements only benchmark when be > 1/3
since policy advocacy is uninformative in these cases. The synergy effect is absent
and the social value of expertise is negative. Even when 5/18 < be < 1/3 and
advocacy is informative under indirect democracy, the platform distortion effect
is dominant. Although the expert is informative, the social value of expertise
is negative and the voter prefers uninformed democracy. When platforms are
distorted without any information being gained, the voter is even worse off. The
worst institution for the voter in all cases is when the expert only sends partisan
endorsements.
The expert’s ranking of these institutions is similar to the voter’s, but not
29In Section II, we extend this intuition and introduce the possibility of direct capture by the expert
of the platforms chosen by a political party. We show that in such a situation voter welfare becomes
equal to that under optimal delegation.
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identical. When be < 5/18, the expert ranks indirect democracy as her top choice,
just like the voter. Indeed, in this case all voters to the right of the median do so.
But, unlike the voter, indirect democracy remains the top choice for the expert
regardless of her bias. The expert never ranks direct democracy at the top. This
is because indirect democracy is not only more informative but also gives rise to
policies that favor the expert more.30
F. Necessity
We now consider two modifications of our baseline model of indirect democ-
racy. Both modifications concern assumptions about commitment that we have
made so far. The first modification varies the commitment available to the parties
and provides insight into what allows voters to obtain the benefits of delegation
under indirect democracy. The second modification varies instead the commit-
ment power available to the expert when she chooses her information transmission
strategies. These two benchmarks identify necessary conditions for the welfare
result in Proposition 4.
Consider a scenario where political parties cannot commit to policy platforms.
Instead, they can achieve a degree of commitment by nominating candidates with
known preferences (captured by the biases bL and bR of the nominated candidates)
from the full set of voters. As before, the parties are office-seeking and choose
a candidate to maximize their probability of winning the election. The expert
provides advice before the parties choose candidates and endorsements after they
do so. Subsequently voters vote. The winning candidate chooses a policy to
maximize her own payoff given all available information. Our next result shows
that the equilibrium outcome in this model of candidate commitment (as opposed
to platform commitment) yields the same outcome as direct democracy.
PROPOSITION 5: In the model of indirect democracy with candidate commit-
ment, both parties choose candidates that are ideologically identical to the median
voter, bL = bR = 0, and so the welfare of the voter is identical to that under direct
democracy.
Proposition 5 identifies a necessary condition underlying our main welfare re-
sult in Proposition 4. It underscores the benefits of programmatic politics over
personality centric ones. To reap the delegation benefits of indirect democracy,
it is important that parties commit through platforms rather than personalities.
We turn now to the second modification of our baseline model. This has to
do with the commitment power (or lack thereof) on the part of the expert. So
30Regardless of be, the worst institution for the expert is uninformed democracy (UD). Since policies
are uninformed also in the endorsements only (EO) benchmark but closer to the expert’s ideological
interests, she always prefers EO to UD. She may even rank EO as her second choice, above direct
democracy. Direct democracy is the expert’s second ranked institution, above EO, only when the gain
to the expert from greater information exchange under direct democracy offsets the loss from policies
that serve the voter’s interests ex post. This occurs for be < 1/
√
32.
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far we have assumed that the expert has no commitment power and engages in
cheap talk. The information she can reveal in equilibrium depends entirely on her
incentive or credibility constraints. We now ask how our welfare result depends on
these constraints, reverting back to our baseline assumption that parties commit
to platforms. Our next result compares voter welfare under direct and indirect
democracy, when the expert faces no incentive constraints. She can commit ex
ante to a (multi-stage) information policy or persuasion mechanism (Kamenica
and Gentzkow, 2011).
PROPOSITION 6: Suppose the expert can commit to an information policy.
Then direct democracy is better for voter welfare than indirect democracy.
When the relevant institution is direct democracy (i.e., the CS model), it is
well known that the optimal information policy with commitment is the policy
of revealing all information. In contrast, under indirect democracy we show that
the expert’s optimal information policy will reveal some but not all information.
From the perspective of voter welfare, direct democracy must then be the su-
perior institution. Under direct democracy, the voter gets his first best full in-
formation payoffs. Under indirect democracy, fixing the information policy of
the expert, voter payoffs can be at most as high as the benchmark where poli-
cies necessarily equal the expected ideal policy of the voter given all available
information. But the payoff from this benchmark must be strictly lower than
the full information payoff. The expert does not disclose all information under
indirect democracy and so the voter faces residual uncertainty about the state
of the world. This uncertainty lowers voter payoffs. Proposition 6 shows that
a necessary condition for indirect democracy to dominate direct democracy is a
lack of commitment on the part of the expert. Voters prefer indirect democracy
only if the expert cannot commit and her credibility is a justifiable concern.
We prove Proposition 6 by performing the following thought experiment. Sup-
pose that at the ex ante stage the expert can commit to delegating her messaging
to a voter with ideological bias bs. Call this voter the surrogate. The surrogate ob-
tains the expert’s information and engages in strategic information transmission
given her own incentives. The surrogate’s ideology bs is a choice variable for the
expert with ideology be. Who is the ideal surrogate from the ex ante perspective
of the expert?
The expert can always choose a perfectly voter aligned surrogate who will reveal
all information. But we show that under indirect democracy the optimal surro-
gate is never perfectly voter aligned. The expert resolves the trade off between
informed policies and policies that serve her interest by choosing a surrogate who
hides some information and ensures that parties pander partially to the expert’s
ideological interests. Since the set of all possible information policies include the
set of policies that can be generated by choosing a surrogate, this shows that the
optimal general information policy under indirect democracy will also hide some
information.
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II. Ideal democracy: technocrats versus populists
Our model in Section I describes situations where the expert influences electoral
outcomes purely through public communication. She does not directly affect
party platforms but nevertheless has significant influence on electoral outcomes.
We now contrast this situation of indirect capture with one where the expert
directly controls the platform choices of one (or more) of the political parties.
We revert also to our baseline assumptions that the expert cannot commit to an
information disclosure policy and that the parties commit to platforms.
Suppose that one of the two political parties is directly controlled by the ex-
pert. The expert chooses this party’s platform, possibly as a function of her
own private information, in order to serve her ideological interests. We call this
the technocratic party. The other party is also ideological but uninformed. It
chooses its platform to maximize the welfare of the median voter. It is a populist
party. After the two parties simultaneously select their platforms, the voter elects
her preferred platform given the information inferred from the observed platform
choices. Our next result characterizes the best equilibrium for the voter in this
game of electoral competition between technocrats and populists.
PROPOSITION 7: Suppose that the expert with ideology be > 0 directly chooses
the platform of the technocratic party, while the other uninformed populist party
simultaneously chooses its own platform. In the best equilibrium for the voter, the
technocratic party will choose a platform x∗e = y+ be in state y, while the populist
party will choose a platform x∗u = 1 − be, following which the voter will elect the
smaller of the two observed platforms.
In the equilibrium described by Proposition 7, the technocratic party’s platform
choice perfectly reveals the state but the chosen platform is the expert’s ideal
policy in each state. The voter elects the technocratic platform xe as long as it is
to the left of the uninformed populist party’s platform xu. If xe > xu, the voter
prefers the populist platform and elects it for sure. Figure 8 depicts the platforms
and outcomes as a function of the state.
Information gives a competitive edge to the technocratic party. Whenever the
expert prefers a policy to the left of the populist party’s equilibrium platform, she
can adopt it as her party’s platform and get the support of a majority of voters,
since the departure from her rival is in a direction opposite to the direction of
her bias, indicating a lower state. This happens whenever y < 1− 2be. When the
expert’s information is relatively extreme and in the direction of her preference
conflict with the average voter, y > 1 − 2be, a majority prefers the uninformed
populist platform and the populist party wins the election. The probability that
the populist wins is 2be, which is increasing in the conflict between the voter
and the expert. Voters will often elect technocrats. But they prefer populists
when technocrats propose policies that seem extreme, resembling support for
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Figure 8. Ideal democracy: technocrats vs. populists.
their special interests (e.g., when the threat of climate change is real).31
On average, direct expert capture of one party is good for voters. Seen as a
mapping from the state y to elected policies, electoral outcomes take the form of
a capped delegation mechanism. In fact, it is the optimal mechanism, in the class
of all mechanisms without transfers (Holmstrom (1984)). A technocratic party
competing against uninformed populists leads to the best of all possible institu-
tions for the voter. The source of the voter’s ex ante welfare gain is the greater
informativeness of the platform proposed by the expert captured technocratic
party.32
What happens if the expert captures not one but both the political parties? It
is easy to see that both parties will propose platforms equal to the expert’s ideal
policy y+be in each state and such a policy will be implemented. We then have a
dictatorship of technocrats, corresponding to the notion of full delegation to the
expert considered in Dessein (2002). It can be shown that such complete expert
capture yields better outcomes for the voter, compared to indirect capture via
public communication (i.e., the model of Section I), if and only if be < 1/3.
31The signaling game of Proposition 7 has other equilibria, including uninformative pooling equilibria.
We present the voter’s most preferred equilibrium in the spirit of our previous equilibrium selection.
32This variant of the model is reminiscent of Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987), where a biased but informed
committee proposes policy choice to a legislature. The closed rule (which does not allow the legislature
to amend the committee’s proposal—policy must revert to the status quo if the proposal is rejected)
is usually superior to the open rule (which allows amendments), for informational reasons. In our
framework, the populist party’s platform acts like the status quo policy in committee settings, except
that its position is determined endogenously through electoral competition.
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Since the capped delegation mechanism of Holmstrom (1984) is the optimal
mechanism, direct capture of only one party is the best of all outcomes for the
voter. It is better than dictatorship of technocrats. In other words, the extent of
expert capture has an interesting non-monotonic effect on voter welfare. When the
expert captures only one party, the presence of the other uninformed, populist
party provides a constraint on the expert’s party that is strictly beneficial for
voters. Dictatorship of technocrats is reminiscent of Plato’s favored institution
of a philosopher-king. Unlike Plato, we find that a philosopher competing in an
election against a know-nothing populist is optimal.33
III. Related literature
Our paper is broadly related to a theoretical literature on media bias which
examines selective or distorted presentation of information to the voting public.
The media, like the expert in our framework, is assumed to have an informational
advantage over the public, which can be leveraged for policy influence. In some
papers, the conclusion rests on the assumption that the informed manipulator
can restrict her message to a subset of voters (Grossman and Helpman (1999),
Stromberg (2004), Chan and Suen (2008)). Wittman (1983), Calvert (1985), and
Gul and Pesendorfer (2012) consider fully public messages, but differ from our
baseline model in that parties are policy motivated, not office motivated. Unlike
in our paper, this results in policy divergence.
There is a literature in which political parties, rather than the media or experts,
hold private information about the state-of-the-world. This literature investigates
to what extent private information is revealed through platform choices (Mar-
tinelli (2001), Martinelli and Matsui (2002), Heidhues and Lagerlof (2003), Laslier
and Van de Straeten (2004), Kartik, Squintani and Tinn (2015)) or cheap talk
messages, i.e., non-binding campaign promises (Harrington (1992), Chakraborty
and Harbaugh (2010), Schnakenberg (2016), Panova (2017), Kartik and Van
Weelden (2019)). Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987, 1989; see also Krishna and Mor-
gan (2001)) study policy advice under asymmetric information, but in a legislative
rather than electoral setting.
There is a literature on candidate valence, which may be a source of asym-
metric information and electoral manipulation but of a fundamentally different
kind. In our framework, voters do not know their policy preference since it is
state-contingent. In the valence literature, voters have deterministic preference
over policies but also care about a second dimension—the ability or character of
elected candidates. Groseclose (2001) and Aragones and Palfrey (2002) examine
policy outcomes when one candidate has a known valence advantage, while Kartik
and McAfee (2007), Boleslavsky and Cotton (2015) and Chakraborty and Ghosh
33It can be shown that if the uninformed party is office-seeking, instead of being ideological, the same
optimal capped delegation mechanism is an equilibrium outcome of electoral competition between the
expert’s technocratic party and the uninformed office-seeker. In effect, therefore, such an uninformed
office-seeker is a pseudo-populist.
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(2016) look at asymmetric information. In particular, the results in Chakraborty
and Ghosh (2016) suggest that private information about valence can give sub-
stantial manipulative powers to the media or expert that can reduce voter welfare.
The message of this paper is that private information on policy can lead to ma-
nipulation but the welfare effect on the average voter is generally positive.
Finally, there is a literature that compares direct and indirect democracy from
the perspective of voter welfare (see Matsusaka (2005) for a survey). This litera-
ture views direct and indirect democracy as processes that trade off politicians’
corruptibility (Kalt and Zupan (1984), Peltzman (1984), Gerber (1996)) against
voters’ ignorance of policy issues (Maskin and Tirole (2004)). We bring a dif-
ferent perspective to this debate, comparing direct and indirect democracy as
mechanisms for acquiring information from third parties (experts).
IV. Conclusion
We reconsider the Hotelling-Downs model of two party electoral competition
in the presence of an ideologically biased but informed expert. The expert can
engage in strategic and public information transmission, providing platform en-
dorsements as well as policy advice. Platform endorsements may influence voters
and determine the electoral prospects of office-seeking parties. In order to obtain
favorable endorsements, parties have an incentive to choose platforms that serves
the expert’s ideological interests. This by itself hurts voters.
However, expert pandering incentivizes the expert to provide detailed policy ad-
vice that allows parties to choose platforms that vary with the information held
by the expert. This information dependence benefits voters. When the expert is
not too ideologically biased, decentralized electoral competition influenced by the
expert yields better average outcomes for voters, compared to directly commu-
nicating with the expert and choosing their own ideal policies. Voter welfare is
maximized if instead of public speeches, the expert directly controls the platform
choices of one of the parties that competes in an election against an uninformed
populist party.
V. Appendix
A. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Fix any two platforms xL, xR. If xL = xR then there
is no choice facing the electorate so suppose xL < xR. Let xmid =
xL+xR
2 be the
midpoint of the platforms. Let I be the information available to all voters at
the voting stage. Our specification of voter preferences implies that a voter with
ideology b strictly prefers xR iff
E[y|I] + b > xL + xR
2
= xmid
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It follows that if the median voter with ideology bmv = 0 strictly prefers xR (resp.,
xL) so do all voters with ideology b > 0 (resp., b < 0).
Proof of Lemma 2. Fix xL, xR. If xL = xR then endorsements have no
role to play, so suppose xL < xR. In an influential equilibrium, the expert has
(at least) two different endorsement messages me and m
′
e that result in xR being
elected with different probabilities after each message. Whenever y + be > xmid
so that the expert strictly prefers xR, the expert will send the message that elects
xR with the highest probability; and similarly for xL. It follows that the expert’s
endorsement can only reveal if y + be > xmid or not.
For the expert to endorse both candidates with positive probability we need
xmid − be ∈ (yl, yh). If the expert endorses xL, the voter learns y ≤ xmid − be.
Then the voter also prefers xL since E[y|y < xmid− be;ma] < xmid. On the other
hand, If the expert endorses xR, the voter learns y > xmid − be. The voter is
willing to vote for xR iff
E[y|y > xmid − be;ma] ≥ xmid
Since y is uniformly distributed in the interval [yl, yh] given ma, the last inequality
holds iff xmid ≤ yh−be. We conclude that a necessary condition for endorsements
to be influential is xmid ∈ (yl, yh − be]. Sufficiency is immediate.
When endorsements are not influential, it could be because yl ≥ xmid − be in
which case the expert always prefers xR; or it could be because xmid > yh − be
in which case an endorsement for xR does not sway the voter. In either case, the
voter’s decision does not depend on the expert’s endorsement and so the voter
must prefer whichever platform is closest to E[y|ma], the expected value of the
state before hearing the expert’s endorsement me.
Proof of Lemma 3. Fix the expert’s advocacy message that reveals that
y ∈ [yl, yh] ⊂ [0, 1]. We proceed in cases.
Case 1. E[y|ma] ≥ yh − be, equivalently, yh − yl ≤ 2be.
We show that in this case both candidates locating at x∗ = E[y|ma], with each
candidate equally likely to win, is a strict Nash equilibrium in platform choices.
For if one candidate deviates to x′ 6= x∗, since yh − yl < 2be, the expert’s zone of
influence (yl + be, yh − be] is empty. So by lemma 2, the platform x∗ = E[y|ma]
will win for sure, implying the deviation to x′ is strictly unprofitable for the other
party.
Case 2. E[y|ma] + be ≤ yh − be, equivalently, yh − yl ≥ 4be.
We show that in this case both candidates locating at x∗ = E[y|ma] + be, with
each candidate equally likely to win, is a strict Nash equilibrium in platform
choices.
If one candidate deviates rightward to x′ > x∗ with (x′ + x∗)/2 ≤ yh − be,
then by lemma 2, an expert endorsement will be influential and the platform that
receives the endorsement will win the election. For the deviating candidate, such
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUEA EXPERT CAPTURED DEMOCRACIES 29
an endorsement that guarantees the election will arrive when
y > (x′ + x∗)/2− be > E[y|me].
Since this event has probability less than 1/2, the deviation is strictly unprofitable.
So suppose that the candidate deviates rightward to x′ > x∗ such that (x′ +
x∗)/2 > yh − be. Then by lemma 2 an endorsement for x′ will not be influential
and the deviating candidate will never win the election so such a deviation is also
strictly unprofitable.
Consider next a leftward deviation to x′ < x∗. Since
(x′ + x∗)/2 < x∗ = E[y|ma] + be ≤ yh − be
the expert will be influential after such a deviation and the platform that re-
ceives the endorsement will win the election. The left platform x′ will receive the
endorsement if
y < (x′ + x∗)/2− be < E[y|me].
which occurs with probability strictly less than 1/2 and so this deviation is also
strictly unprofitable.
Case 3. yl + be < E[y|ma] < yh − be < E[y|ma] + be, equivalently, 2be <
yh − yl < 4be.
We show that in this case both candidates locating at x∗ = yh − be, with each
candidate equally likely to win, is a strict Nash equilibrium in platform choices.
If one candidate deviates rightward to x′ > x∗ then (x′ + x∗)/2 > yh − be,
then by lemma 2, an expert endorsement for x′ will not be influential. Since
E[y|ms] < yh−be = x∗, by lemma 2, the deviating candidate will lose the election
for sure and so such a deviation is strictly unprofitable.
Consider next a leftward deviation to x′ < x∗. Since
(x′ + x∗)/2 < x∗ = yh − be
the expert will be influential after such a deviation and the platform that re-
ceives the endorsement will win the election. The left platform x′ will receive the
endorsement if
y < (x′ + x∗)/2− be < E[y|me],
an event that occurs with probability less than 1/2 and so such a deviation is
strictly unprofitable.
CLAIM 1: In each of the three cases above, the Nash equilibrium described is the
unique equilibrium in platform choices.
To prove the claim, we note first that the game of platform choice between the
two parties is a two person zero sum game. We recall here a known result that
Nash equilibria are exchangeable in two-person zero sum games, i.e., if (a1, a2)
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and (b1, b2) are both Nash equilibria (possibly in mixed strategies) then so are
(a1, b2) and (b1, a2) and, further, all these equilibria yield the same payoffs to the
two players (see, e.g., Raghavan, (1994)). From this it is immediate that a strict
Nash equilibrium must be unique.34 This concludes the proof of the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 1. Follows from Lemma 3.
Proof of Proposition 2. Follows from the discussion in the text.
Proof of Proposition 3. Existence of an equilibrium where the expert’s
advocacy message reveals an interval is immediate since the expert can be un-
informative in the first stage. From Lemma 3, for any first stage message that
reveals an interval, platforms converge. Standard arguments (see, e.g., Lemma 1
in CS) then imply N∗ (be) is finite.
Consider an N - element partition of the state space [0, 1] given by
{[c0, c1), [c1, c2), . . . , [ci−1, ci), [ci, ci+1), . . . , [cN−1, cN )}, c0 = 0, cN = 1.
Recall that for an arbitrary interval [ci−1, ci) of length li = ci − ci−1, Lemma 3
implies the following:
• 4be ≤ li iff x∗ (ci−1, ci)) = ci−1+ci2 + be (expert pandering);
• 2be < li < 4be iff x∗ ([ci−1, ci)) = ci − be (partial pandering);
• li ≤ 2be iff x∗ ([ci−1, ci)) = ci−1+ci2 (voter pandering).
We first show that if an interval length li ≤ 2be then i = 1, i.e., voter pandering
can only occur in the left-most interval. Suppose to the contrary that message
[ci−1, ci) leads to voter pandering with i > 1. What happens in the interval
[ci−2, ci−1) immediately to the left that has length li−1 > 0? If it also displays
voter pandering then we must have
ci−1 + be − ci−2 + ci−1
2
=
ci + ci−1
2
− (ci−1 + be)
using the indifference of type ci−1. This yields li − li−1 = 4be which is impossible
since li ≤ 2be. If instead that the interval [ci−2, ci−1) displays partial pandering,
then indifference for type ci−1 implies
ci−1 + be − (ci−1 − be) = ci + ci−1
2
− (ci−1 + be)
This yields li = 4be which is impossible since li ≤ 2be. So the interval [ci−2, ci−1)
immediately to the left must involve expert pandering. Indifference for type ci−1
34Notice that in the unique Nash equilibrium in cases 2 and 3, it is necessary that each platform is
equally likely to win, otherwise one candidate will have a proftiable deviation. In case 1, if we do not
assume uniform tie breaking, there is some indeterminacy in equilibrium win probabilities, just as in the
classical median voter theorem, but this has no bearing on elected platforms and on welfare.
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then implies
ci−1 + be −
(
ci−1 + ci−2
2
+ be
)
=
ci + ci−1
2
− (ci−1 + be),
which yields li = li−1 + 2be which is also impossible since li ≤ 2be and li−1 > 0.
We conclude that if li ≤ 2be then i = 1.
We show next that if expert pandering occurs in some interval [ci−1, ci) with
i < N , then li+1 = li, i.e., if expert pandering occurs in i-th interval with i < N ,
then every interval to the right must be of the same length as the i-th interval
and also display expert pandering. To see this, consider two successive intervals
[ci−1, ci) and [ci, ci+1) and suppose the interval [ci−1, ci) displays expert pandering
with i < N . We must then have li ≥ 4be. Let x ∈ [ci, ci+1) be the policy for the
interval [ci, ci+1). Indifference of type ci implies x > ci + be and
(ci + be)−
(
ci−1 + ci
2
+ be
)
= x− (ci + be).
From the previous step li+1 > 2be since voter pandering can occur only in the
left-most interval. If 2be < li+1 < 4be, then x = ci+1 − be and the indifference
condition above yields li+1 = li/2 + 2be ≥ 4be, a contradiction. So it must be
that that li+1 ≥ 4be and the policy x = ci+ci+12 + be displays expert pandering.
The indifference condition above yields li = li+1 ≥ 4be and all such intervals must
have the same length.
Next, consider an interval [ci−1, ci) with 2be < li < 4be that leads to partial
pandering. We show now that if i < N , then we must have li+1 = 4be,. To see
this, recall from above that since [ci, ci+1) is not the left-most interval, li+1 > 2be.
If li+1 > 4be, then using the indifference of type ci
ci + be − (ci − be) = ci+1 + ci
2
+ be − (ci + be),
we see li+1 = 4be, a contradiction. But if li+1 ≤ 4be, then using the indifference
of type ci
ci + be − (ci − be) = ci+1 − be − (ci + be),
we see li+1 = 4be and this interval displays expert pandering.
In sum, the necessary properties of an equilibrium are as follows: only the left-
most interval can display voter pandering, if an interval displays partial pandering
then every interval to its right displays expert pandering, and if an interval dis-
plays expert pandering so must every interval to its right that must also all be of
the same length.
Fix the state space [0, 1] and let R be the remainder when 4be divides 1. Con-
sider the equilibrium with the highest ex ante expected payoffs to the expert and
the median voter. Call this the most informative equilibrium (for brevity). We
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show now that this equilibrium is given by a unique N∗- element interval partition
of the state space that has the following properties:
1) Policy advice is uninformative (i.e., N∗ = 1) if and only if 1/3 ≤ be;
2) If 1/4 ≤ be < 1/3, then N∗ = 2 with voter pandering in the left interval and
partial pandering in the right interval with the cutoff type c1 =
2
3 − 2be;
3) If be < 1/4, then there are three cases to consider
a) if R > 3be, then N
∗ = b 14be c + 2, the left-most interval yields voter
pandering, followed by partial pandering, followed by expert pandering
with the cutoffs given by c1 =
2
3R − 2be and ci = R + 4be(i − 2) for
i ≥ 2.
b) if 2be ≤ R ≤ 3be, then N∗ = b 14be c + 1, the left-most interval yields
partial pandering while all other intervals yield expert pandering with
the cutoffs given by c1 = R and ci = R+ 4be(i− 1) for i ≥ 2;
c) if R < 2be,then N
∗ = b 14be c + 1, the left-most interval yields voter
pandering, followed by partial pandering, followed by expert pandering
with the cutoffs given by c1 =
2
3(R+ 4be)− 2be and ci = R+ 4be(i− 1)
for i ≥ 2.
Part (1): Assume on the contrary that be ≥ 13 and there exists an informative
equilibrium. Then the only candidate is of the form {[0, c), [c, 1]} such that the
interval [0, c) leads to a voter pandering policy x∗ = c2 while the interval [c, 1)
yields a partial pandering policy x∗ = 1−be. The expert of type c > 0 is indifferent
so that c = 2/3− 2be < 0, a contradiction.
Part (2) follows immediately from the proof of Part (1) and the earlier charac-
terization of the necessary properties of equilibria in this proof.
Part (3): Since 1 > 4be it follows that R > 0. When R > 3be, we create
1−R
4be
intervals of size 4be from the right and apply Part (2) of the lemma on the
‘remaining’ left-most section [0, R) to obtain the partition. When 2be ≤ R ≤ 3be,
we again create 1−R4be intervals of size 4be from the right and this time apply Part
(1) of the lemma on the ‘remaining’ left-most section [0, R] to obtain the partition.
When R < 2be, we create
1−R
4be
− 1 intervals of size 4be from the right and apply
Part (2) of the lemma on the ‘remaining’ left-most section [0, R + 4be) to obtain
the partition
To complete the proof of the proposition, we now show that the expert and
the median voter have identical preference rankings over the equilibrium set and
that the most informative equilibrium described above yields the highest ex ante
payoff. To prove this we employ the following steps.
STEP 1: Let P1 = {[0, c1), [c1, c2), . . . , [cN−1, 1]} be an equilibrium such that the
length of the interval li = 4be for all i ≥ 3, l1 < 2be and 2be < l2 < 4be with
l1 + l2 < 4be. Consider the partition P2 = {[0, c2), [c2, c3), . . . , [cN−1, 1]}.
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CLAIM 2: The partition P2 is also an equilibrium but the median voter and the
expert strictly prefer P1 to P2.
Notice that under the assumed conditions, the policy x∗([0, c2)) for P2 is equal
to the policy x∗([c1, c2)) under P1. It follows that P2 is also an equilibrium
partition. It is necessary and sufficient to compare the welfare of the agents
concerned over the state sub-interval [0, c2).
Note that by construction, x∗([0, c1)) is the median voter’s best policy condi-
tional on the event [0, c1). Hence, conditional on the event [0, c1), the median
voter’s expected payoff from x∗([0, c1)) is strictly higher than from x∗([0, c2)) =
x∗([c1, c2)). Also, conditional on the event [c1, c2), the expected payoff of the
median voter from x∗(([c1, c2)) equals that from x∗([0, c2)) since x∗([0, c2)) =
x∗([c1, c2)). Given [0, c1) is a strictly positive probability event, it follows that
the median voter strictly prefers P1 to P2.
Now consider the expert. Since P1 and P2 are equilibrium partitions, the expert
strictly prefers x∗([ci−1, ci)) to x∗([cj−1, cj)) for all y ∈ [ci−1, ci), i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2.
Again, since x∗([0, c2)) = x∗([c1, c2)), it follows that conditional on the event
[0, c1), the expected payoff of the expert from x
∗([0, c1)) is strictly greater than
that from x∗([0, c2)). Finally, conditional on the event [c1, c2), the expected payoff
of the expert is equal as x∗([0, c2)) = x∗([c1, c2)). Thus the expert also strictly
prefers P1 to P2.
STEP 2: Let P3 = {[0, c1), ..., [cN−1, 1]} and P4 = {[0, c′1), . . . , [c′M−1, 1]} be two
equilibrium partitions such that li and l
′
j are each greater or equal to 4be, where
li and l
′
j are the interval lengths for P3 and P4 respectively.
CLAIM 3: The median voter and the expert strictly prefer P3 to P4 iff N > M .
The expected utility of any agent with arbitrary bias β ≥ 0 from partitions P3
and P4 are given by
W (P3;β) = − 1
12N2
− 1
N
N∑
i=1
(E[y|[ci−1, ci)] + β − x∗([ci−1, ci)))2,
and
W (P4;β) = − 1
12M2
− 1
M
M∑
i=1
(E[y|[c′i−1, c′i)] + β − x∗([c′i−1, c′i)))2.
Also, x∗([ci−1, ci)) = E[y|[ci−1, ci)] + be and x∗([c′i−1, c′i)) = E[y|[c′i−1, c′i)] + be.
Hence,
W (P3; be) = − 1
12N2
,W (P4; be) = − 1
12M2
and the result follows for the expert. Further,
W (P3; 0) = − 1
12N2
− be,W (P4; 0) = − 1
12M2
− be,
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and the result follows for the median voter as well.
This concludes the proof of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 4. We show here that (a) is equivalent to (d). The
proofs of the other claims follow from the discussion in the text.
If the expert’s bias be > 1/24, we can show by direct calculation that the voter
is better off in the most informative equilibrium of our model compared to the
most informative equilibrium of CS as long as be < 5/18. Accordingly, we focus
attention on the case where be ≤ 1/24 in what follows.
Recall that the loss to the median voter from a N element CS equilibrium is
(4) LCS(N) =
1
12
N∑
i=1
l3i ,
where
(5) li = l1 + 4be(i− 1), i ≥ 2
and
∑N
i=1 li = 1. Since l1 ≥ 0, using (5) in (4) we obtain
LCS(N) ≥ 1
12
(
64b3e
(
N(N − 1)
2
)2)
.
Let L∗ be the loss to the median voter from the most informative equilibrium of
our model. Let L∗(M) be the loss from from the most informative “equal length
equilibrium”. In such an equilibrium with M intervals, M = b 14be c with each
interval of equal length 1/M and of size at least 4be. Such an equilibrium exists
for be ≤ 1/4 and, by Lemma 3, platforms display complete expert pandering in
each interval. By Proposition 3,we have
L∗ < L∗(M) =
1
12
M∑
i=1
1
M3
+ b2e =
1
12
1
M2
+ b2e
Therefore, to show LCS(N) > L
∗ for all be ≤ 1/24, it suffices to show
(6) 64b3e
(
N(N − 1)
2
)2
≥ 1
M2
+ 12b2e.
Note that since be ≤ 1/24, we have N ≥ 4 and M ≥ 6.
Let b∗(N) = 12N(N−1) the cutoff at which the N element CS equilibrium is born,
i.e., at be = b
∗(N), l1 = 0 so that l2 = 4be, l3 = 8be, and so on and all CS intervals
have lengths that are multiples of 4be. It follows that at this value of be we must
have M = N(N−1)2 = 1/4be in the most informative equal length equilibrium with
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M elements with each interval of length exactly 4be. In this case (6) becomes
64b3e
(
1
4be
)2
> 16b2e + 12b
2
e
or be < 1/7 which holds since 1/7 > 1/24 ≥ be. We conclude that (6) holds at
be = b
∗(N) for all N ≥ 4. It remains to establish (6) for be ∈ (b∗(N + 1), b∗(N))
for all N ≥ 4.
We proceed as follows. Starting from b∗(N), as we lower be slightly, N and
M remain fixed in (6). But when we lower be all the way to b
∗(N + 1), we
get a new N + 1 element CS equilibrium and a corresponding M ′ = N(N+1)2 =
M + N element most informative equal-length equilibrium. As shown above,
LCS(N + 1) > L∗(M ′).
In between b∗(N+1) and b∗(N), there areN−1 further cutoff values of be at each
of which the number of intervals of the most informative equal-sized equilibrium
grow by 1. Let b′(M + k) be these cutoff values of be, with k = 0, ...., N , and
b∗(N) = b′(M) > ... > b′(M + k) > ... > b′(M +N) = b∗(N + 1).
Notice that the r.h.s. of (6), if one uses the M + k element most informative
equal length equilibrium, is less than what obtains if one uses the M element
equal length equilibrium.
We now introduce further slack into our analysis by comparing the loss from
the N element CS equilibrium with the M element equal length equilibrium,
which is not necessarily the most informative equal length equilibrium when be ∈
(b∗(N + 1), b∗(N)). For such be, N and M are fixed, M =
N(N−1)
2 and so (6)
becomes
(7) 64b3eM
2 > 1/M2 + 12b2e.
The difference between the l.h.s. and r.h.s. of (7) is monotone increasing in be
if and only if be > 1/8M
2. But this is readily verified to be true using be ≥
b∗(N + 1) = 12N(N+1) , M =
N(N−1)
2 and N ≥ 4.
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose the two parties have committed to candi-
dates with ideologies bL and bR. Fix the first stage message ma and the second
stage message me. The median voter (and hence a majority) will strictly prefer
to elect the candidate who is ideologically closest to the median voter since such
a candidate will choose policies that are closest to what the median voter likes
given all available information. So such a candidate will win the election for sure,
regardless of the information revealed by the expert. It follows that is in the
incentive of each office-seeking party to choose a candidate that is identical in his
ideology to the median voter.
Proof of Proposition 6. We suppose that the expert’s role is played by a
voter with ideology bs (the surrogate) and consider the payoff to the expert with
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ideology be from choosing such a surrogate. We provide a proof only for the claim
that the optimal surrogate will have ideology bs > 0 under indirect democracy,
since it is well known that under direct democracy (the CS model) the optimal
surrogate has bias bs = 0.
Suppose the expert (with bias be > 0) commits to reveal all her information
privately to a surrogate with bias bs > 0 before the game of electoral competition
starts. Subsequently, the surrogate takes the role of the expert in the game
summarized in Figure 1. The loss to the expert from a N -interval equilibrium
with the surrogate bs is
L(bs; be) =
N∑
i=1
li
∫
li
(y + be − ŷi)2dy
li
where li = length of ith interval and ŷi = “action” in the ith interval. Let yi =
expected value of y given it is in i-th interval and let δi = ŷi−yi be the “distortion”
in the action from what the voter would like. We can write
L(bs; be) =
N∑
i=1
li
∫
li
(y − yi + be − δi)2
dy
li
=
N∑
i=1
li
∫
li
(y − yi)2
dy
li
+
N∑
i=1
li
∫
li
(be − δi)2dy
li
=
1
12
N∑
i=1
l3i −
N∑
i=1
li(2be − δi)δi + b2e
The expected loss to the expert from choosing a voter aligned surrogate, i.e.,
bs = 0, is b
2
e. So the difference in the loss between full disclosure to the voter and
choosing a surrogate with bias bs > 0 is
∆ = b2e − L(bs; be) =
N∑
i=1
li(2be − δi)δi − 1
12
N∑
i=1
l3i .
To show that bs = 0 is not optimal it suffices to find some bs and associated N
for which ∆ > 0. We pick a N partition equilibrium where a N + 1 equilibrium
is ‘just born’ for some N > 1. In this equilibrium, the left most interval is of
length 3bs (with partial pandering) and every other interval is of length 4bs (with
surrogate pandering). For such an equilibrium, we must have l1 = 3bs and li = 4bs
for i ≥ 2, with ∑i li = 1. Further, δ1 = bs2 and δi = bs for i ≥ 2. Using these, we
obtain
∆ =
N∑
i=1
li(2be − δi)δi − 1
12
N∑
i=1
l3i = b
2
s
[
3be + 4bs + 8(N − 1)be − 7
3
]
.
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As long as bs 6= 0, ∆ > 0 if and only if the term in braces above is strictly
positive. Furthermore, for fixed be, as bs becomes small, N grows and so 8(N−1)be
becomes arbitrarily large and so the term inside braces must be positive for bs
small enough. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7. We need to show that the following profile of strate-
gies is an equilibrium. The (expert captured) technocratic party chooses a plat-
form x∗e = y + be as a function of y while the uninformed populist party chooses
a platform x∗u = 1− be. Notice that x∗e ∈ [be, 1 + be]. Let xe denote a generic plat-
form choice by the expert’s technocratic party and xu a generic platform choice
by the uninformed populist party.
First consider the voter’s sequential rationality in this candidate equilibrium.
When xe /∈ [be, 1+be], the voter’s beliefs are free. We choose beliefs that allow the
voter elect the populist platform for sure in this case. Otherwise, the voter infers
y = xe − be and elects the platform closest to this inferred state, randomizing if
indifferent in a manner to be specified below. Notice that if the two parties behave
as specified, the voter elects min[x∗e, x∗u]. Since the specified profile of strategies
implements the outcome of the optimal mechanism, it follows that if this profile
is an equilibrium it is also the best equilibrium for the voter.
Consider now the techocratic party’s rationality. If it behaves as specified, then
for all y < x∗u − be, we get xe = x∗e = y + be < x∗u and so the voter elects x∗e.
Since this is the ideal policy of the expert in these states, there is no profitable
deviation for her party in such cases. On the other hand, if y + be ≥ x∗u, and
the expert chooses xe = x
∗
e = y + be, the voter’s loss from electing the expert’s
platform is be while his loss from electing the uninformed platform is at most be.
So the voter weakly prefers to elect the populist platform and we suppose that
the voter elects the populist platform when indifferent. If the expert deviates to
any other platform xe < x
∗
u, and in the interval [be, 1+be] in these states, then the
voter infers y = xe−be < xe < x∗u and elects the technocratic platform. But since
y + be > x
∗
u, this outcome is worse for the expert than letting x
∗
u get elected. So
such a deviation is unprofitable On the other hand, if the expert’s party deviates
to some xe /∈ [be, 1 + be], then voter beliefs are free and the voter elects x∗u so such
a deviation is not profitable either. We conclude that the technocratic party’s
behavior is sequentially rational in all states y.
It remains to check that populist party is playing a best response, given the
technocratic party’s specified behavior. Since the voter infers the state y = x∗e−be
from the informed party’s platform, the populist platform is elected whenever
xu ∈ [y − be, y + be] and loss to the voter from electing this party is not higher
than the loss b2e from electing the other party. So the ex ante expected loss
(negative of payoff) to the populist party from an arbitrary platform xu is∫ max[xu−be,0]
0
b2edy +
∫ max[xu+be,1]
max[xu−be,0]
(y − xu)2dy +
∫ 1
max[xu+be,1]
b2edy
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and it is straightforward to check that x∗u = 1− be minimizes this, completing the
proof.
B. Other equilibria
The equilibrium characterized in Proposition 3 is the most informative equilib-
rium (and payoff dominant for both the expert and the voter) within the class of
equilibria where (i) the expert’s advocacy message is interval partitional and (ii)
we select an influential equilibrium in the endorsement stage whenever one ex-
ists. Such a selection rule does not necessarily select the ex ante payoff dominant
equilibrium.
Are there other equilibria under indirect capture, that do not satisfy the re-
strictions above and that are better for the voter than the equilibria we analyze?
For completeness, we present two examples in this section that show that such
equilibria may exist. For both examples, we take be = 1/8.
EXAMPLE 1: Non-interval advocacy.
We construct an equilibrium where the expert’s first stage advocacy message
does not necessarily reveal an interval for y and the parties choose different plat-
forms after such non-interval stage messages.35 In the top panel of Figure 9, we
present the most informative equilibrium for be = 1/8, using Proposition 3. This
equilibrium has three intervals, with corresponding convergent platform choices,
as depicted in the figure. The left-most interval displays voter pandering, fol-
lowed by partial pandering in the middle, followed by expert pandering in the
right-most interval.
In the bottom of Figure 9, we depict another equilibrium that we construct from
the top equilibrium. In this equilibrium, policy advocacy does not necessarily take
an interval partitional form. The expert sometimes sends a message that reveals
that y lies in the union of two disjoint, equally probable intervals, [1/20, 1/10] and
[19/20, 1] (depicted in red in Figure 9). The other possible advocacy messages
each reveal an interval for y with subsequent platform choices in accordance with
Lemma 3, as depicted in the figure.
For the non-interval message, y ∈ [1/20, 1/10] ∪ [19/20], there is platform di-
vergence of a particular sort. One party chooses a platform exactly at 13/40, the
common platform choice after the interval message y ∈ [1/10, 9/20]. The other
party chooses its platform at 33/40, the common platform choice after the interval
message y ∈ [9/20, 19/20]. Subsequently, the expert endorses the left platform
13/40 if y ∈ [1/20, 1/10] and the right platform 33/40 when y ∈ [19/20, 1]. The
endorsement is influential and the endorsed party wins the election with probabil-
ity 1. When the parties choose their platforms, each party expects to receive an
35If the parties choose the same platform for every possible message, then standard arguments show
that advocacy must take an interval partitional form (see lemma 1 in CS, for instance). So for platform
divergence to occur in our model, it is necessary that the expert’s first message does not take the form
of revealing an interval for y.
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Figure 9. Non-interval equilibrium.
influential endorsement and win the election with probability 1/2, given the choice
of the other party. It is straightforward to check the expert’s advocacy strategy
and subsequent platform choices by the two parties, as depicted in Figure 9 and
described above, constitute an equilibrium. We omit the details.
The key feature that allows one to construct such an equilibrium is that the
conditional expectation E[y|y > xmid − be,ma] is not strictly increasing in xmid
when ma reveals that y is in the union of two disjoint intervals. This creates
a multiplicity in possible equilibrium platform choices following a non-interval
advocacy message. This allows to choose platforms in precisely a way the makes
it incentive compatible for the expert to send a first stage non-interval message
(and all her other messages).
EXAMPLE 2: Selection at the endorsement stage.
In this example, we create an interval partitional equilibrium using the non-
interval equilibrium depicted in the bottom of Figure 9. We do this by altering
the selection rule at the endorsement stage. Specifically, we select the babbling
outcome at the endorsement stage, after certain platform choices, even though the
expert can credibly send influential endorsements. Freedom in selecting between
equilibria in the continuation game allows a wide range of possible outcomes.
In the top of Figure 10, we present the non-interval partitional equilibrium of
Figure 9. In the bottom of Figure 10, we present an outcome equivalent interval
partitional equilibrium, constructed by coalescing the two segments, [1/20, 1/10]
and [19/20, 1], of the non-interval message with an adjacent interval message.
In particular, we specify that at the advocacy stage the expert either reveals
y ∈ [0/1/20] or that y ∈ [1/20, 9/20], or that y ∈ [9/20, 1]. For each such interval
advocacy message, we specify that both parties choose a common platform iden-
tical to what they would choose in the top panel of Figure 10, after an interval
advocacy message from the expert, as depicted in the figure.
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Figure 10. Selection at endorsement stage.
These platform choices are not consistent with Lemma 3. But we ensure that it
is incentive compatible for the parties to choose the specified platforms by suitable
selection at the endorsement stage. For instance, when the expert’s first stage
message reveals y ∈ [9/20.1], Lemma 3 states that both parties should locate at
17/20, the expert’s expected ideal point. However, in the bottom of Figure 10,
we support the common platform choice at the lower point 33/40 by selecting
the babbling outcome at the endorsement stage if any party deviates rightwards.
This eliminates the possibility of a profitable deviation that relies on credible
endorsements, forcing both parties to behave as specified.
It should not be surprising that communication games with multiples stages of
communication may have a large multiplicity of equilibria. The two examples of
this section show that the restriction to the class of equilibria that we focus on
limits our freedom to support a wider range of possible outcomes. Since we do
not necessarily select the ex ante payoff dominant equilibrium for the voter, we
understate the welfare benefits of indirect democracy under expert capture.
*
REFERENCES
Aragones, Enriqueta, and Thomas R. Palfrey. 2002. “Mixed Equilibrium
in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate.” Journal of Economic Theory
103 (1): 131-161.
Argenziano, Rosella, Sergei Severinov, and Francesco Squintani. 2016.
“Strategic Information Acquisition and Transmission.” American Economic
Journal: Microeconomics 8 (3): 119-155.
Banks, Jeffrey S., and John Duggan. 2005. “Probabilistic Voting in the
Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-Motivated Candidates.” Social
Choice and Strategic Decisions: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey Banks. Berlin and
Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUEA EXPERT CAPTURED DEMOCRACIES 41
Boleslavsky, Raphael, and Christopher Cotton. 2015. “Information and
Extremism in Elections.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 7 (1):
165-207.
Bovens, Mark, and Anchrit Wille. 2017. Diploma Democracy: The Rise of
Political Meritocracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brennan, Jason. 2016. Against Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Brunetti, Aymo, and Beatrice Weder. 2003. “A Free Press is Bad News
for Corruption.” Journal of Public Economics 87 (7-8): 1801-1824.
Burke, Edmund. 1774. “Speech to the Electors at Bristol at the Conclusion
of the Poll.” Reprint 2014. The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke, Vol.
3, Party, Parliament and the American War, 1774-1780. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Calvert, Randall L.. 1985. “Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model:
Candidate Motivation, Uncertainty and Convergence.” American Journal of Po-
litical Science 29 (1): 69-95.
Caramani, Daniele. 2017. “Will versus Reason: Populist versus Technocratic
Forms of Political Representation and Their Critique to Party Government.”
American Political Science Review 111 (1): 54-67.
Chakraborty, Archishman, and Parikshit Ghosh. 2016. “Character En-
dorsements and Electoral Competition.” American Economic Journal: Microe-
conomics 8 (2): 277-310.
Chakraborty, Archishman, and Rick Harbaugh. 2010. “Persuasion by
Cheap Talk.” American Economic Review 100 (5): 2361-2382.
Chan, Jimmy, and Wing Suen. 2008. “A Spatial Theory of News Consump-
tion and Electoral Competition.” Review of Economic Studies 75 (3): 699-728.
Chen, Ying, Navin Kartik, and Joel Sobel. 2008. “Selecting Cheap Talk
Equilibria.” Econometrica 76 (1): 117-136.
Crawford, Vincent P., and Joel Sobel. 1982. “Strategic Information Trans-
mission.” Econometrica 50 (6): 1431-1452.
Dessein, Wouter. 2002. “Authority and Communication in Organizations.”
Review of Economic Studies 69 (4): 811-838.
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York:
Harper and Row.
Fairbrother, Malcolm. 2014. “Economists, Capitalists and the Making of
Globalization: North American Free Trade in Comparative-Historical Perspec-
tive.” American Journal of Sociology 119 (5): 1324-1379.
Gentzkow, Matthew and Jesse M. Shapiro. 2006. “Media Bias and Repu-
tation.” Journal of Political Economy 114 (2): 280-316.
Gerber, Elisabeth R. 1996. “Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular
Initiatives.” American Journal of Political Science 40 (1): 99-128.
42 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MONTH YEAR
Gilligan, Thomas W., and Keith Krehbiel. 1987. “Collective Decision-
making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive
Amendment Procedures.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3 (2):
287-335.
Gilligan, Thomas W., and Keith Krehbiel. 1989. “Asymmetric Information
and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous Committee.” American Journal of
Political Science 33 (2): 459-490.
Groseclose, Tim. 2001. “A Model of Candidate Location when One Candidate
Has a Valence Advantage.” American Journal of Political Science 45 (4): 862-
886.
Groseclose, Tim, and Jeffrey Milyo. 2005. “A Measure of Media Bias.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 120 (4): 1191-1237.
Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman. 1999.“Competing for En-
dorsements.” American Economic Review 89 (3): 501-524.
Gul, Faruk, and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. 2012. “Media and Policy.” Unpub-
lished.
Harrington Jr., Joseph E. 1992. “The Revelation of Information through
the Electoral Process: An Exploratory Analysis.” Economics & Politics 4 (3):
255-276.
Heidhues, Paul, and Johan Lagerlo¨f. 2003. “Hiding Information in Electoral
Competition.” Games and Economic Behavior 42 (1): 48-74.
Holmstrom, Bengt. 1984. “On the Theory of Delegation.” In Bayesian Models
in Economic Theory, edited by Marcel Boyer and Richard Kihlstrom. 115-141.
New York: North-Holland.
Hotelling, Harold. 1929. “Stability in Competition.” Economic Journal 39
(153): 41-57.
Johnston, Christopher D., and Andrew O. Ballard. 2016. “Economists
and Public Opinion: Expert Consensus and Economic Policy Judgments.” Jour-
nal of Politics 78 (2): 443-456.
Kalt, Joseph P., and Mark A. Zupan. 1984. “Capture and Ideology in the
Economic Theory of Politics.” American Economic Review 74 (3): 279-300.
Kamenica, Emir, and Matthew Gentzkow. 2011. “Bayesian Persuasion.”
American Economic Review 101 (6): 2590-2615.
Kartik, Navin, and R. Preston McAfee. 2007. “Signaling Character in
Electoral Competition.” American Economic Review 97 (3): 852-870.
Kartik, Navin, Francesco Squintani, and Katrin Tinn. 2015. “Informa-
tion Revelation and Pandering in Elections.” Unpublished.
Kartik, Navin, and Richard Van Weelden. 2019. “Informative Cheap Talk
in Elections.” Review of Economic Studies 86 (2): 755-784.
Krishna, Vijay, and John Morgan. 2001. “A Model of Expertise.” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 116 (2): 747-775.
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUEA EXPERT CAPTURED DEMOCRACIES 43
Krishna, Vijay and John Morgan. 2001. “Asymmetric Information and Leg-
islative Rules: Some Amendments.” American Political Science Review 95 (2):
435-452.
Laslier, Jean-Francois, and Karine Van de Straeten. 2004. “Electoral
Competition under Imperfect Information.” Economic Theory 24 (2): 419-446.
Martinelli, Ce`sar. 2001. “Elections with Privately Informed Parties and Vot-
ers.” Public Choice 108 (1-2): 147-67.
Martinelli, Ce`sar, and Akihiko Matsui. 2002. “Policy Reversals and Elec-
toral Competition with Privately Informed Parties.” Journal of Public Economic
Theory 4 (1): 39-61.
Maskin, Eric, and Jean Tirole. 2004. “The Politician and the Judge.” Amer-
ican Economic Review 94 (4): 1034-1054.
Matsusaka, John G.. 2005. “Direct Democracy Works.” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 19 (2): 185-206.
Milgrom, Paul. 1981. “Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems
and Applications.” Bell Journal of Economics 12 (2): 380-391.
Mill, John S. 1861. Considerations on Representative Government. Reprint
1977. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XIX, Essays on Politics
and Society, Part II, edited by John M. Robson. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press.
Osborne, Martin J., and Al Slivinski. 1996. “A Model of Political Competi-
tion with Citizen-Candidates.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 (1): 65-96.
Panova, Elena. 2017. “Partially Revealing Campaign Promises.” Journal of
Public Economic Theory 19 (2): 312-330.
Peltzman, Sam. 1984. “Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting.” Jour-
nal of Law and Economics 27 (1): 181-210.
Raghavan, T. E. S. 1994. “Zero-Sum Two-Person Games.” In Handbook of
Game Theory, edited by Robert J. Aumann and Sergiu Hart. Volume 2. 735-
768. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Sapienza, Paola, and Luigi Zingales. 2013. “Economic Experts versus Av-
erage Americans.” American Economic Review 103 (3): 636-42.
Shapiro, Jesse M. 2016. “Special Interests and the Media: Theory and An
Application to Climate Change.” Journal of Public Economics 144 (C): 91-108.
Schnakenberg, Keith E. 2016. “Directional Cheap Talk in Electoral Cam-
paigns.” Journal of Politics 78 (2): 527-541.
Stromberg, David. 2004. “Mass Media Competition, Political Competition
and Public Policy.” Review of Economic Studies 71 (1): 265-284.
Wittman, Donald. 1983. “Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative
Theories.” American Political Science Review 77 (1): 142-157.
